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NATURALISM, THEISM,
OBLIGATION AND SUPERVENIENCE
Alvin Plantinga

Take naturalism to be the idea that there is no such person as God or anything
like God. Many philosophers hold that naturalism can accommodate serious
moral realism. Many philosophers (and many of the same philosophers) also
believe that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, and even
on naturalistic properties (where a naturalistic property is one such that its
exemplification is compatible with naturalism). I agree that they do thus supervene, and argue that this makes trouble for anyone hoping to argue that
naturalism can accommodate morality.

Naturalism in philosophy is all the rage these days. Some naturalists
believe that naturalism can accommodate morality—genuine objective
moral obligation, for example; they think moral realism, including moral
realism about obligation, is compatible with naturalism. Many others,
both theists and naturalists, believe that naturalism cannot accommodate
morality.1 Some who think naturalism and moral realism incompatible,
accept naturalism, apply modus ponens, and conclude that moral realism is
false. Others think moral realism is clearly true; sensibly enough they apply modus tollens, concluding that naturalism is false. I propose to support
the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing
directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way
of arguing that it can.
I. Naturalism, Realism and Theism
An intuitively plausible way, perhaps the most plausible way, to make a
case for the thought that naturalism can accommodate morality is to argue
for the following thesis:
EQUIVALENCE: For any moral property M, there is a naturalistically
acceptable property P such that N (for any x, x has M if and only
if x has P)
1
For example, Michael Rea, “Naturalism and Moral Realism,” in Knowledge and Reality,
ed. Thomas Crisp, David Vander Laan and Matthew Davidson (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2006);
Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), essays 6 and 7; Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral
Queerness Revived,” Synthese 92.2 (1992), pp. 221–260; J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right
and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1977); and many others.
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where ‘N’ expresses metaphysical or broadly logical necessity.
True, those who argue that naturalism can accommodate morality do
not typically argue in this way, at any rate not explicitly. But sometimes
they do,2 and often when they don’t do so, their mode of arguing, if made
fully explicit, would involve this procedure. For example, consider the
way in which David O. Brink proposes that naturalism can accommodate
morality.3 His idea is that moral properties are exhaustively constituted by
naturalistic properties. But what is this ‘constitution’; under what conditions is a property constituted by other properties? Brink doesn’t say a lot
about this, but he does give examples of constitution. One kind of example
involves an object’s being constituted by the matter that makes it up: a
wooden doorstop, for example, is constituted by molecules of wood. This
kind of constitution doesn’t seem relevant to the constitution of a property
by other properties; properties aren’t material objects and are not literally
made out of other properties. On the other hand, there is realization; here
Brink doesn’t give examples, but examples are not far to seek. Consider
the property of being a doorstop: this property is multiply realizable in the
sense that very different sorts of things can be (function as) a doorstop (a
piece of wood, a book, a wastebasket, a lead cube, . . . ). Take a particular
doorstop—a wedge-shaped piece of wood, for example: we could say that
here the property of being a doorstop is realized by the other properties
had by that piece of wood. There will be some set(s) of properties P1, P2,
. . . Pn had by that piece of wood such that necessarily, anything that has
those properties is a doorstop. We could then say that those properties P1,
. . . Pn constitute the property of being a doorstop. Of course other sorts of
things could be a doorstop: an iron, a gallon of milk, etc., so that there will
be many different sets of properties meeting the above condition. Each of
those sets of properties will entail the property of being a doorstop, and
each will constitute that property. Further, the property of being a doorstop will entail the disjunction of all the sets of properties that realize the
property of being a doorstop.
Now suppose this is how things go when naturalistic properties constitute a moral property—moral obligation, e.g., If so, where a given act A
is morally obligatory, there will be various sets of naturalistic properties
such that necessarily, if A has one of those sets of naturalistic properties,
then A has the property of being morally obligatory, and the property
of being morally obligatory is then constituted by that set of properties.
And of course when a set of properties entails obligation, the conjunction of those properties is a conjunctive property that entails it. To argue
that moral obligation is constituted by naturalistic properties, therefore,
one would have to argue that there are sets of naturalistic properties that
entail obligation, and hence (conjunctive) properties that entail it. The
See below, pp. 259ff. on Frank Jackson.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
in particular pp. 156–160, 176–77, and 193–97. (Here I’m grateful to William FitzPatrick.)
2
3
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disjunction of these properties, furthermore, will entail obligation, and
also be entailed by it; so there will be a naturalistic property (the disjunction of those conjunctive properties) that is equivalent in the broadly
logical sense to the property of obligation.
The most natural (maybe the only natural) way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate morality, therefore, is to argue for some form
of EQUIVALENCE. I’ll begin by showing that, by virtue of the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral, EQUIVALENCE is in fact true. I’ll
go on to argue, however, that its truth doesn’t so much as slyly suggest
that naturalism is compatible with or can accommodate moral realism.
Supervenience, so I argue, therefore presents a real problem for those who
think naturalism can accommodate morality—or at any rate for those who
propose to argue for that thesis. But first, what is naturalism and what is
moral realism?
The latter is characterized variously, but most of the differences will
make no difference for my argument. Essential to moral realism, as I’m
thinking of it, is the thesis that there exist such moral properties as being
right, being wrong, being obligatory, being supererogatory, and so on, and true
propositions that predicate moral properties of actions: for example, it is
wrong to torture people for fun and one ought to care for one’s aging parents.
Furthermore, many of our ordinary moral claims and assertions express
such propositions. Still further, moral truths are objective, in the sense that
they are in a certain way independent of human beliefs and desires.4 It is
wrong to torture people for the fun of it, and would remain wrong even
if most or all of the world’s population came to believe that this behavior
is perfectly acceptable, and indeed came to desire that it be much more
widely practiced.5
Naturalism comes in even more flavors than moral realism; there are
many varieties together forming an analogically related Thomistic (or
Wittgensteinian) family. An adequate characterization of it (if there is a
single ‘it’ there) would require a paper all its own. Some hold that naturalism is not so much as a doctrine or endorsement of a proposition, so
that naturalism as such is neither true nor false; for example, Michael Rea
proposes that naturalism is a research program,6 and Bas van Fraassen
that it is a “stance.”7 Among those who hold that naturalism is indeed a
philosophical claim, the large division, perhaps, is into epistemological
4
As John Mackie put it, moral obligation “involves a call for action or for the refraining
from action, and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy
or choice, his own or anyone else’s,” Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 33.
5
For a fuller account of moral realism with which I am in substantial sympathy, see chapter 2 of Terence Cuneo’s The Normative Web (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). “Substantial sympathy”: I’m doubtful about what Cuneo says about moral realism and independence of (human) minds.
6
Michael Rea, “Naturalism and Moral Realism.” Rea argues that one who endorses naturalism taken as a research program cannot consistently also endorse moral realism.
7
The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
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and metaphysical naturalism.8 The former is the view that the methods of
science are paramount for inquiry; roughly speaking, science is all there is
to know and the methods of science are the correct methods to employ in
any inquiry.9 Although epistemological naturalism has serious problems,
my focus here will be on metaphysical naturalism.
Of course metaphysical naturalism itself comes in several varieties. According to one variety (one with obvious connection to epistemological
naturalism), the only entities that exist are those that are postulated by
science. This variety suffers from an annoying (and oft-noted) defect. If we
are thinking of current science, it seems to display a sort of temporal chauvinism: how can we be sure that future science won’t postulate entities of
a sort very different from those acknowledged by current science? Who
knows what science 500 years from now might be like—perhaps it will endorse Leibnizian monads, or immaterial thinkers, or sentient elementary
particles and panpsychism, or kinds of entities of which we currently have
no conception. Why think current posits should be exalted over those that
may be coming? On the other hand, if we say that it is final science, or
science “at the end of inquiry” that is at issue, then we really aren’t told
much of anything; our grasp of final science and the end of inquiry is, at
present, a little weak.
There is another kind of naturalism, however, that is more solid and
venturesome, and it is this variety with which I’m presently concerned.
According to Barry Stroud,
the first thing to do with naturalism, as with any philosophical doctrine,
. . . is to ask what it is against. Naturalism on any reading is opposed to supernaturalism. . . . By ‘supernaturalism” I mean the invocation of an agent
or force which somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and so
whose doings cannot be understood as part of it. Most metaphysical systems of the past included some such agent. A naturalistic conception of the
world would be opposed to all of them.10

Perhaps we can focus this account by thinking of metaphysical naturalism as the view that there is no such person as God—the God of the
great theistic religions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam—or anything like
8
Methodological naturalism is often added as a third branch; I’ll include it as a variety of
epistemological naturalism.
9
Thus Wilfrid Sellars: “In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science
is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.” “Empiricism
and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I: The
Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and
Michael Scriven (University of Minnesota Press, 1956), paragraph 41.
10
“The Charm of Naturalism,” presidential address to the Pacific division of the APA,
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70.2 (Nov. 1996), p. 44. By
the end of the talk, however, naturalism seems to have lost a bit of its punch: “What I am
calling open-minded or expansive naturalism says we must accept everything we find ourselves committed to in accounting for everything we agree is so and want to explain” (p.
54). The supernaturalist (the theist, for example) will be happy to embrace naturalism thus
construed (although not everyone will be happy to embrace what the theist finds herself
committed to).

NATURALISM, THEISM, OBLIGATION AND SUPERVENIENCE

251

God. There is no all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good creator of the
universe; furthermore, there are no beings much like him—no angels or
demons, nothing of the sort we ordinarily think of as supernatural. This
specification of naturalism suffers from vagueness (does it exclude immaterial selves or souls? Tillichian grounds of being?), but it will have to
suffice for present purposes. Naturalism obviously entails atheism; it is
stronger than atheism, however, in that there are varieties of atheism—
classical Platonism and Stoicism, for example, and perhaps the idealism
of the young Hegel—it excludes. Henceforth I’ll use ‘naturalism’ to denote this variety of metaphysical naturalism, though what I say will be
applicable in various degrees to other sorts of naturalism, epistemological,
metaphysical, and nonpropositional.
Now many have thought naturalism has a real problem with ethics—
in particular, it seems to preclude moral realism. Theists often think moral obligation is intimately connected with God’s will or his commands;11
hence (say some theists) the serious naturalist cannot consistently think
there is any such thing as moral obligation. Many naturalists concur. According to John Mackie, it would be strange, queer, weird (given naturalism), if there were such a thing as genuine and objective moral value.
It would be queer if some actions had this property of being just plain
wrong, where this wasn’t definable or analyzable in terms of such naturalistic properties as what people like, or want, or desire, or naturalistic conditions of human beings having to do with pleasure, length and
quality (another value term) of life, and the like. As Mackie puts it, “If
there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in
the universe.”12 The thought is that moral obligation doesn’t fit at all well
with naturalism; naturalism cannot accommodate obligation; if naturalism were true, so the thought goes, there wouldn’t be any such thing as
objective moral obligation.
Some naturalists, on the other hand, have disputed this conclusion, for
example the “Cornell realists,” who, starting in the 1980s, have maintained
11
For representative current versions of theistic ethics, see, e.g., Robert Adams, Finite
and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); William Mann, “Theism
and the Foundations of Ethics,” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion, ed. William Mann (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005); and Philip Quinn, “Divine Command
Theory,” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2000).
12
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 38. One might be pardoned for questioning the
strength of an argument from queerness. The argument form

It would be really weird if things were such and such
Therefore
Things aren’t such and such
seems initially a bit dubious. Perhaps the real force of the argument is just that it is a way of
repeating and elaborating the intuitive inclination to think that objective moral value doesn’t
fit with naturalism.
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that naturalism can perfectly well accommodate the existence and exemplification of specifically moral properties, including moral obligation.
What I want to investigate is this question: is it true that naturalism, taken
as above, can accommodate morality?
Put this way, the first thing to see is that this question needs a little
sharpening. What, exactly, or even approximately, is this ‘accommodating’? We might begin by returning to the question I raised above: is
(1)

If naturalism were true there would be no such thing as moral
obligation—that is, no actions would possess the property of being morally obligatory13

true? Here we immediately run into serious problems having to do with
the modal status of theism and naturalism. Suppose we begin by thinking
of theism as classical theism. This includes the claim that God is a necessarily existent being, one who exists in all possible worlds. What naturalism
asserts, then, is that there is no such person as God (as classically thought
of) and nothing like God. Naturalism is therefore the conjunction of two
propositions:
(2)

There is no such person as God,

and
(3)

There are no beings distinct from but like God.

(2), given classical theism and given the usual S5-like ways of thinking
about modality, is noncontingent: necessarily true or necessarily false.
(3), however, is contingent: there are possible worlds in which it is true
(worlds in which, for example, there are immaterial souls or angels) and
worlds in which it is false. So is naturalism contingent or noncontingent?
If (classical) theism is true, naturalism is necessarily false. But if theism
is false, the first conjunct of naturalism is necessarily true and the second
contingent (contingently true or contingently false).
A theist, therefore, ought to think that (1) has a necessarily false antecedent, and hence, given the standard way of thinking about entailment,
is true and indeed necessarily true. That isn’t of much interest, however,
because (from the theistic perspective)
(4)

If naturalism is true, there is such a thing as moral obligation

is also necessarily true, and for the same reason.
Similar problems arise with the consequent of (1). Transposing (1), we
get
(1*) If there is such a thing as moral obligation, then naturalism is
false.

13
Where a special case of the consequent would be there being no such property as moral
obligation.
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A theist, however, will be very likely to think that it is necessary that there
be such a thing as moral obligation;14 hence both the antecedent and consequent of (1*) are true; hence each entails the other, but with little apparent relevance to the question whether naturalism can accommodate moral
obligation. This way of thinking about our question—can naturalism accommodate moral obligation?—runs into a thicket of difficulties, difficulties arising from the noncontingent nature of theism, and perhaps also
the noncontingent nature of propositions involving the existence of moral
obligation. Such difficulties are familiar, certainly; but that doesn’t make
them any more tractable. This isn’t the place to try to figure out how to
reason about noncontingent propositions of this sort; that would require
more than a whole paper on its own account. What is clear, however, is
that addressing our question by way of asking after the truth of (1) does
not promise to be fruitful. Let’s try a different approach.
II. The Question
Consider another area where we might raise a similar question. We might
wonder whether naturalism can accommodate proper function and allied
properties such as health, disease, dysfunction, function simpliciter, and, so
I say, rationality and warrant.15 Some naturalists are convinced that these
properties have no place in a properly naturalistic world picture; other
naturalists disagree, holding that these properties fit perfectly well with
naturalism. One way to enter the question is to ask whether the property
functions properly can be, as they say, explained in naturalistic terms. We
can expand this question as follows. Some properties are clearly naturalistically acceptable, in something like the sense that their exemplifications
don’t imply the existence of entities naturalists are not prepared to countenance. We may be unable to say more precisely what constitutes naturalistic acceptability; perhaps we shall have to give some examples and hope
for the best. Examples would be properties that show up in current physical science, such as, (having) mass, such and such a spin, such and such a velocity and location, such and such a charge and so on. Other examples would
come from the life sciences: (being) a genome, fitness enhancing, a prokaryote,
a phenotype, and so on. But presumably many properties that don’t show
up in physical and biological science will also be naturalistically acceptable (henceforth ‘naturalistic’): for example, being an action of promise keeping, causing someone injury,16 helping one’s aging parents and maximizing the
world’s hedonic index. Others are clearly not naturalistic (but, we could say,
14
Well, perhaps not quite. Many theists think obligation depends upon divine commands,
or divine willings. But suppose there had been no created rational agents; would there still
have been those divine commands or volitions? Perhaps not; so perhaps what is necessary is
that if there are rational agents, there is such a thing as moral obligation.
15
Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 11 “Naturalism vs. Proper Function?”
16
Perhaps you think injury belongs in the same category as proper function and health,
and is therefore not obviously naturalistic. If so, substitute some such property as breaking
someone’s leg, causing someone to contract lung cancer, etc.
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‘supernatural’): for example being an angel, being hated by a demon, being
created by God and so on.
How would one show or argue that naturalism can accommodate proper function? A plausible way, perhaps the most plausible way, would be to
find a clearly naturalistic property P such that proper function is equivalent
in the broadly logical sense to P, i.e., such that
(5)

For any object x, x functions properly if and only if x has P

is metaphysically necessary. We’ll assume that P can be complex, and that
naturalistic propertyhood is closed under (infinite) conjunction and disjunction: if A and B are naturalistic properties, so is their conjunction and
their disjunction (though not necessarily their complements). A way to
show that proper function is naturalistic, then, is to find some necessarily true proposition of the form displayed by (5), where P is naturalistic.
I’ve argued elsewhere that the various attempts to find such a proposition
have so far come to grief, and that prospects for success along these lines
are bleak.17
Now we might ask whether the same procedure can be followed with
respect to moral properties, for example, moral obligation. Could it be
shown that obligation is naturalistic by finding a necessarily true proposition of the form
(6)

An action x is morally obligatory if and only if x has P

where P is naturalistic? For example,
(7)

Necessarily, an action x is morally obligatory if and only if x contributes to the greatest happiness of the greatest number?

Can we show that moral obligation is naturalistic by finding some naturalistic property to which it is equivalent?
Before addressing this question, we need a couple of qualifications. First,
there is the familiar distinction between prima facie obligation and all-thingsconsidered obligation. Any act of promise-keeping is prima facie obligatory,
but circumstances have to be right for it to be all-things-considered obligatory. For example (to take a page from Plato), you have borrowed my AK
47 assault rifle, promising to return it today. Yesterday you learned that I
am intending to use it to shoot up the philosophy department, which by
my lights has taken insufficient note of my merits. I demand the return of
my weapon; but you are not obligated to return it. An act, then, is prima
facie obligatory in virtue of being an act of promise-keeping; it is all-thingsconsidered obligatory in virtue of being an act of promise-keeping in the
right circumstances. To keep things simple, let’s think just about prima facie
obligation; all-things-considered obligation will presumably be something
like a vector sum of prima facie obligations. We are therefore asking whether
17
See my Warrant and Proper Function, chap. 11, and (with Michael Tooley) Knowledge of
God (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 20ff.
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one can show that naturalism can accommodate prima facie obligation by
showing that there is a naturalistic property equivalent to prima facie obligation. (Henceforth I’ll take ‘obligation’ to mean ‘prima facie obligation.’)
And second, set aside actions the performance of which obviously18
entails the existence of supernatural beings—for example, the actions of
obeying divine commands, refusing to make Faustian bargains with Satan,
telling the truth to an angel, and the like. Naturalists will think such actions
can’t be done and hence are not obligatory. Theists will think some of these
actions are indeed obligatory, but in the present dialectical context it would
be inappropriate to expect the naturalist to try to show that such obligations can be accommodated by naturalism. We should therefore restrict our
attention to actions the performance of which does not obviously entail the
existence of supernatural beings—‘natural actions,’ as we might call them.
III. Supervenience
Thus fortified, we can return to our question: can one show that moral
obligation (qualified as above) is naturalistic by finding some naturalistic
property to which it is equivalent? One might be pardoned for thinking
so; if one did, however, one would be mistaken. The reason has to do with
the fact that moral properties supervene on nonmoral properties: you can’t
have a moral difference without having a nonmoral difference. Thus, for
example, it’s not possible that there be two (natural) actions which have
the same nonmoral or descriptive properties, but one of which is morally
obligatory and the other is not. Recognition of the supervenience of moral
on descriptive or nonmoral properties goes back at least to G. E. Moore.19
Now some descriptive properties are not naturalistic (being created by God,
being an angel, for example); but presumably moral properties supervene
on properties that are naturalistic as well as descriptive. For example, it
couldn’t be that (natural) acts A and B differ with respect to being obligatory
but coincide on their naturalistic properties; it couldn’t be that A and B differ with respect to being obligatory but are both acts of promise keeping
(and also coincide on their other relevant naturalistic properties). What
I propose to argue is the following: the fact that moral properties supervene on naturalistic properties means that finding a naturalistic property
logically equivalent to a moral property M (obligation, for example) is nowhere nearly sufficient to show that M is natural.
In order to state the argument, we must take a brief look at some of
the properties of supervenience.20 The supervenience relation is usually
18
“Obviously”: if God is a necessary being (and construing entailment the usual way) every proposition entails that there is such a person as God.
19
Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge, 1922), p. 263. We might make heavy weather
over the distinction between moral and descriptive properties (is the disjunction/conjunction
of a moral with a descriptive property moral, or descriptive, or both, or neither?) but let’s
confine our attention to moral obligation, and let’s initially suppose that we know, roughly at
least, what descriptive properties are.
20
See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online) article on supervenience; and Jaegwon Kim, “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” Metaphilosophy 21 (1990).
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thought of as a relation between sets or kinds of properties: many believe,
for example, that mental properties supervene on physical properties. Our
present concern is with the thought that moral properties, in particular
moral obligation, the property of being morally obligatory, supervene on
naturalistic properties. Putting the basic idea of supervenience a bit more
precisely, we can say
(8)

Properties of kind P supervene on properties of kind P* just if
necessarily, for any objects x and y, if x and y differ with respect to
properties of kind P, they also differ with respect to properties of
kind P*.

We’ll be concerned with moral obligation; so the special case in which we
are interested would be
(9)

Obligation supervenes on naturalistic properties if and only if
necessarily, if (natural) acts A and B differ with respect to being
obligatory, they also differ with respect to naturalistic properties

or
(10) Obligation supervenes on naturalistic properties if and only if
necessarily, if (natural) acts A and B coincide on their naturalistic
properties, then they also coincide with respect to being obligatory.
(9) and (10) aren’t quite right; as they stand the right hand parts of the
biconditionals are trivially true. That is because acts A and B can’t coincide on all their naturalistic properties and still be distinct acts; one of A’s
naturalistic properties, for example, will be the property of being identical with A. Again, it would take us too far afield to try to state them more
exactly, and in any event it’s doubtful that the gain in precision would
outweigh the resultant pedantry.
There are several varieties of supervenience: global (which itself comes
in more than one variety), local, regional, weak, strong and still others;
for our purposes it is the distinction between weak and strong supervenience that is of most interest. Note first that supervenience claims can be
put by way of quantification over possible worlds; we can state (9), for
example, as
(9*) Obligation supervenes on naturalistic properties if and only if for
any possible world w, if acts A and B differ with respect to being
obligatory in w, they also differ with respect to their naturalistic
properties in w.
(9*) would be a specification of weak supervenience, which we could
put more generally as
(11) Properties of kind A weakly supervene on properties of kind B
just if for any possible worlds w and any objects x and y, if x and
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y coincide on their B properties in w, then they also coincide on
their A properties in w.
Strong supervenience, on the other hand, goes as follows:
(12) Properties of kind A strongly supervene on properties of kind B
just if for any possible worlds w and w* and any objects x and y in
w and w*, if x in w coincides on properties of kind B with y in w*,
then x in w coincides on properties of kind A with y in w*.
We can see the difference between strong and weak supervenience
as follows. Say that x’s weight is given by how much x weighs. John and
George coincide on their weight in w (the actual world, let’s say): each
weighs 190 lbs in w. Then they also coincide on the property weighing more
than Sam in w—either they both have it, in w, or they both lack it there.
Hence weighing more than Sam weakly supervenes on weight. But weighing
more than Sam does not strongly supervene on weight: perhaps John in w21
weighs the same as George in w*, but John weighs more than Sam in w and
George weighs less than Sam in w*: that could be the case if Sam weighs
more in w* than in w. Therefore weighing more than Sam supervenes weakly
but not strongly on weight. The property believes truly that Sam is ill-tempered weakly supervenes on the property believes that Sam is ill-tempered: let
‘P’ name the proposition Sam is ill-tempered; then if in w S and S* coincide
on believes P, they also coincide in w on believes P truly. But believes truly
that Sam is ill-tempered does not strongly supervene on believes that Sam
is ill-tempered. For suppose P is true in w but not in w*, and suppose in w
and w*, respectively, S and S*, respectively, believe P. Then S in w does not
coincide with S* in w* on the property believes P truly; S has that property
in w while S* lacks it in w*.
As is only proper, therefore, weak supervenience does not in general
entail strong supervenience. But which kind of supervenience—weak or
strong—characterizes the relationship between descriptive and moral
properties? Pretty clearly it’s strong supervenience. We can see this as follows. A natural act that is obligatory will be obligatory in virtue of exemplifying some naturalistic property—for example, being an act of promisekeeping, being an act of refraining from stealing, being an act of helping one’s
aging parents, and the like; and it’s necessary that an act that has one of
these properties is obligatory. Furthermore, a natural act is not obligatory
unless there is some naturalistic property in virtue of which it is obligatory. So consider the set M of naturalistic properties in virtue of which a
natural act is obligatory. Clearly the property being obligatory and being a
21
‘John in w has P’, of course, is a variant of ‘John has P in w’, i.e., ‘Necessarily, John is such
that if w were actual, John would have P’. If we want to insist that ‘John in w’ and ‘John in w*’
are denoting terms, they denote the same thing, namely John. To avoid the misunderstanding sometimes dogging expressions like ‘John in w has P’ we could put (12) as follows:

(12*) Properties of kind A strongly supervene on properties of kind B just if for any possible worlds w and w* and any objects x and y in w and w*, if x has the same B properties in w as y has in w*, then x has the same A properties in w as y has in w*.
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naturalistic property strongly supervenes on M. For suppose acts A in w
and B in w* coincide on M properties. A in w will have a set of M properties; that set of M properties will entail either that A is obligatory or that it
is not. But B in w* has the same set of M properties; this set of M properties
will entail that B is obligatory in w* just if it entails that A is obligatory in
w; hence A in w coincides on obligation with B in w*.
Obligation, therefore, strongly supervenes on naturalistic properties. It
follows furthermore that there are naturalistic properties that are logically
equivalent to obligation. We can see this as follows. Any property in M
(any property in virtue of which an act is obligatory) entails obligation;
hence the disjunction M1 v M2 v . . . Mn entails O. But since an act is O only
if there is a naturalistic property in virtue of which it is O, if an act A is O,
it has some property in M; hence O also entails M1 v M2 v . . . Mn. Hence
there is a naturalistic property N that is equivalent in the broadly logical
sense to the property of being obligatory.
IV. The Question Again
We are now prepared to answer the question with which we started: can
one show that moral obligation is naturalistic by finding some naturalistic property to which it is (metaphysically, broadly logically) equivalent?
Clearly not. For suppose moral obligation is as naturalistically unacceptable as you please. Suppose, for example, that some version of divine command ethics is correct: what makes an action (prima facie) obligatory is the
property of being commanded or enjoined by God.22 More exactly (since
God could issue commands addressed only to some persons) what makes
an action obligatory is God’s commanding all persons to perform it. Still
more exactly, what makes an action obligatory is that it is an essential
property of God to command all persons to perform it, i.e.,
(13) What makes an action A obligatory is that it is an essential property of God to command all persons23 to perform A.
What makes an action prima facie obligatory, then, would be a property
that obviously entails that there is such a person as God; moral obligation,
therefore, would presumably be naturalistically unacceptable in excelsis.
Even so, however, it would still be the case, by the above argument, that
there is a descriptive property equivalent to obligation. And that property
might be naturalistic as well as descriptive. For suppose, as theists typically think, God is a necessary being and it is an essential property of God
to command persons to tell the truth, and to refrain from murder, theft,
adultery and covetousness; more generally, suppose it is essential to God
to command persons to treat others with love and respect. These properties
22
Or, more modestly, suppose that necessarily, an action is obligatory only if God approves its performance.
23
More precisely, it is an essential property of God to issue this command to all persons
if there are persons (creatures with moral status). This slightly complicates but doesn’t compromise the argument.
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and their complements are naturalistic; hence under these conditions there
will be a naturalistic property equivalent to moral obligation, despite the
fact that what makes an action morally obligatory obviously entails that
there is such a person as God. Hence finding a naturalistic property that is
logically equivalent to obligation doesn’t show for a moment that obligation is itself naturalistic. To show that obligation is naturalistic, one must
find a naturalistic property that is much more tightly connected with obligation; mere equivalence isn’t sufficient.
V. Sparsism to the Rescue?
Of course this argument depends on the supposition that there are equivalent but distinct properties. Frank Jackson rejects this assumption in proposing what he calls the “location problem” for ethics.24 He points, first,
to the supervenience of moral on descriptive properties, arguing (a little
casually) that for any moral property M, there is an equivalent descriptive
property D. But Jackson holds that there are no metaphysically equivalent
but distinct properties; he therefore holds that M is identical with D. He
then concludes that M is really a descriptive property.25 Following David
Lewis (but at a bit of a distance), call this thought—the thought that if a
property A is equivalent to a property B, then A is identical with B—the
sparse view of properties and its alternative the abundant view. “At a bit of
a distance:” Lewis thought of sparse properties as those that are in some
way fundamental to the physical universe, the properties, perhaps, that
would figure in a completed physics; I take the sparse view of properties
to be simply the idea that there are no distinct but equivalent properties.
Among sparse properties, therefore, there will be the properties involved
in completed physics, but also such properties as being human, keeping a
promise, being obligatory, and so on.
Now there is much to deplore about the sparse view of propertyhood.
It implies that the property of being the square root of 9 is the very same
property as that of being the fifth root of 243—despite the fact that many
believe that the number 3 is the square root of 9 but fail to believe (perhaps
because of inattentiveness in high school) that the number three is the fifth
root of 243. This conception of properties implies a corresponding sparse
conception of propositions. According to the sparse view of propositions,
there is only one true mathematical proposition, which, as it happens,
is also identical with the one true proposition of first-order logic (not to
mention the true proposition of modal logic), which is also identical with
the one true metaphysical proposition, and also with (as the theist sees it)
the proposition that there is such a person as God, or (as the atheist sees
it) the proposition that there is no such person. This is not easy to believe,
even after much practice.
From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 125ff.
Couldn’t he just as well conclude that D is really a moral property? Presumably so;
perhaps the right conclusion from Jackson’s perspective is that M (or D) is both moral and
descriptive.
24
25
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Abundantists, on the other hand, will think that there are metaphysically equivalent but distinct propositions. The proposition there is a smallest prime is equivalent either to there is such a person as God, or it’s false that
there is such a person as God; nevertheless it is distinct from each of them.
This is not the place to embark on an abundantist theory of properties,26
but abundantists will often tie propositional identity and distinctness to
possibility of belief. Thus, if it is possible to believe that there is a smallest prime without believing that there is such a person as God—i.e., if the
propositions there is a smallest prime and there is such a person as God are
such that it is possible to believe the first but fail to believe the second—
then (by Leibniz’s Law) the proposition there is a smallest prime is distinct
from the proposition there is such a person as God. More generally, where
‘S and S*’ are sentential letters, if it is possible to believe that S but fail to
believe that S*, then the proposition that S is distinct from the proposition
that S*. (Of course abundantism, the thought that there are distinct but
equivalent properties and propositions, does not depend on this particular way of arguing for the distinctness of these propositions.) The abundantist will hold that there is a similar sufficient condition for distinctness
with respect to properties; for example, if it is possible to believe that 2 is
the successor of 1 without believing that 2 is the smallest prime, then the
properties being the successor of 1 and being the smallest prime are distinct,
but equivalent in the metaphysical or broadly logical sense.27
You might think the difference between abundantists and sparsists is of
little consequence. You might think, if you go with the abundant view, that
those who accept the sparse view really use ‘property’ to refer to equivalence classes of properties; if you go with the sparse view, you might
think those who accept abundance really use ‘property’ to denote pairs
of properties with something else—‘representations’28 of some kind, perhaps. More likely, you might think that sparsists and abundantists don’t
actually differ with respect to the meaning they attach to ‘property,’ but
hold different theories about what properties are like and how many of
them there are. You might go on to add that the difference between these
theories is relatively insignificant, since each theory can model the other:
26
One with which I have considerable sympathy is presented in Peter van Inwagen’s “A
Theory of Properties,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2004).
27
Here appeal may be made to Kripke: hasn’t he taught us that water is H2O, and indeed
that it is necessary that water is H2O? The abundantist is committed to thinking that the
property of being water (the property expressed by ‘is water’) is distinct from the property
of being H2O. Clearly many, e.g., our ancestors, have grasped the first but not the second.
She can agree, however, that it is necessary that water is H2O: Necessarily, every sample of
water is a sample of H2O. She can agree with Kripke that we are inclined to think, perhaps
under the baneful influence of mistaken views about the function of kind terms, that ‘water’
expresses such properties as being clear, odorless, tasteless, and filling the lakes and streams; she
can add that what Kripke gets us to see, if he’s right, is that ‘water’ does not express those
properties, but is instead a rigid designator of the stuff that actually has those properties. As
I would put it, ‘water’ expresses the (or an) essence of that stuff.
28
See a page or so below.
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sparsists can model abundantism in properties and representations, and
abundantists can model sparsism in equivalence classes of properties.29
The fact is, however, that there is ordinarily a significant difference between sparsists and abundantists: they differ with respect to our grasp of
or epistemic access to properties. On the abundant conception, one thinks
we have a direct grasp or apprehension of some properties—such properties as being triangular, being equiangular, being an elephant, being taller than
Sam, and so on, as well as of such properties as being right, or obligatory, or
permissible. Of course there are other properties of which we don’t or may
not have a direct grasp. Suppose I know little about quantum mechanics; I
do know, however, that there is a property had by electrons that physicists
refer to as ‘spin,’ but that’s about all I know in this neighborhood. Then I
have at best an indirect grasp of this property. It can also happen that I
have a grasp of a certain property, but fail to have a grasp of properties
equivalent to it; thus I may have a grasp of the property being half of six
but, due to my lamentable ignorance, fail to have a grasp of the property
being the 5th root of 243.
On the sparse conception, however, things are different. There is the
property being the 5th root of 243; that is the same property as being half of
six, and being 1/3 ∫03 x dx. Hence if I have a grasp of the one, I also have a
grasp of the other two, they being the same property. But how can I have a
grasp of being 1/3 ∫03 x dx if I have never so much as heard of definite integrals? Here sparsists often appeal to representations. Thus Jackson:
Cases where we think that a triangle is equiangular while failing to think
that it is equilateral are ones where we have a separation in modes of representation in thought for what is, all the same, one and the same property in
our sense of ‘property’. We have two ways of singling out or representing to
ourselves what is one and the same potential feature of reality.30

The property being half of six is the same property as being 1/3 ∫03 dx; it’s
just that we have two different representations of it, one connected, somehow, with the phrase ‘being half of six’ and the other with ‘being 1/3 ∫03
dx’. But what are these “representations”? Presumably they are not those
very phrases or any other linguistic items; but then what are they? It
sounds as if they are like what is expressed by definite descriptions (“two
ways of singling out . . . what is one and the same potential feature of reality”), so that the case in question would be like that where we single out
or represent to ourselves the number three by the descriptions the second
smallest prime and the cube root of 27. Now here what we do is single out
the number three by means of properties unique to it—being the second
smallest prime and being the cube root of 27. But the sparsist’s representations of properties can’t themselves, presumably, be other properties; for
of course the same problem would arise about them. We would no more
29
Of course abundantists won’t think that these equivalence classes really are properties;
unlike properties, they have members, and are not had by anything.
30
From Metaphysics to Ethics, p. 126.
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have a direct grasp of those properties than we do of the property being
half of six; for them, as for being half of six, we would require representations, which would themselves be properties requiring representations,
and so on. But if these representations aren’t themselves properties, what
are they?
We may safely leave this problem to the sparsists. But surely sparsism
will help with the project of showing that moral obligation is naturalistic? Moral obligation supervenes on naturalistic properties: hence there
is a naturalistic property equivalent to it; hence by sparsism, obligation
is identical with that naturalistic property; hence obligation is itself naturalistic. Sadly enough, given sparsism, things aren’t nearly that simple.
True, by supervenience there is an apparently naturalistic property N
equivalent to and hence, by sparsism, identical with moral obligation. But
suppose divine command ethics is correct, in the version outlined above.
Then what makes an action obligatory is its being an essential property
of God to command all persons to perform that action. If so, obligation is
also equivalent to and hence by sparsism identical with being such that it
is an essential property of God to command all persons to perform it. Hence it
could be that obligation = N = being such that it is an essential property of God
to command all persons to perform it.
By way of example: suppose the property maximizes the world’s hedonic index is proposed as the naturalistic property equivalent to obligation.
Perhaps this property is indeed equivalent to and hence (by sparsism)
identical with moral obligation. But perhaps it is also equivalent to and
hence identical with the property being such that it is an essential property of
God to command all persons to perform it. For perhaps the basic divine command issued to all persons is thou shalt maximize the world’s hedonic index. If
these things are correct, then maximizes the world’s hedonic index is identical
with obligation and with being such that it is an essential property of God to
command all persons to perform it. Given sparsism, therefore, the fact that
there is an apparently naturalistic property identical with obligation is
quite compatible, epistemically speaking, with its also being the case that
moral obligation is identical with the property being such that it is an essential property of God to command all persons to perform it. Hence finding an
apparently naturalistic property N equivalent to obligation fails to show,
given sparsism, that obligation is naturalistic. Indeed, given sparsism it is
epistemically possible that the apparently naturalistic property in question—maximizes the world’s hedonic index, for example—is identical with
the property of being such that it is an essential property of God to command all
persons to perform it and hence not naturalistic after all. As I say, sparsism
makes things really difficult.31

31
If, for all we can tell, the property maximizes the world’s hedonic index just is the property
being such that it is an essential property of God to command all persons to perform it, doesn’t it
seem that, on sparsism, our grasp of or access to properties is pretty minimal? Wouldn’t it be
better to jettison them in favor of those representations whatever exactly they are?
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VI. Brief Illustrative Interlude
So far I’ve argued that the existence of a naturalistic property P equivalent
to moral obligation utterly fails to show that obligation is itself natural—
and this on both the sparsist and the abundantist conception of properties.
I’d like to illustrate this state of affairs by examining a couple of attempts
to provide a naturalistic account of morality.
VI.A.
First, Peter Railton’s “Moral Realism.”32 Perhaps Railton isn’t aiming
precisely to show that naturalism can accommodate moral realism; it
may be that his project here is closer to that of providing a “reforming
definition” of moral terms, where the reforming definition preserves, if
not necessarily all, at least a significant part of common sense morality.33
What I propose to do, however, is to see how Railton’s proposals fare,
considered as an attempt to show that naturalism can accommodate morality by finding naturalistic properties equivalent to moral properties.
Let me repeat: this is probably not how Railton takes his project; but
that’s no reason not to consider how his proposal fares regarded as such
an attempt.
Now Railton means to defend moral realism from a naturalistic perspective; in particular, he argues that a particular naturalistic property is
identical with or equivalent to moral rightness. He begins by outlining
the notion of objectified subjective interest. Your subjective interest is the set
of your wants or desires, whether conscious or unconscious. Among your
subjective interests, therefore, might be the desires to get rich, to climb at
the 5.11 level, to worship God more effectively, and to purchase a Lamborghini. Of course some of these may be ignorant desires, in the sense that
if you knew more you would no longer have the desire in question. For
example, perhaps you think a Lamborghini costs $27,000; if you knew that
it really costs $270,000, you’d no longer want to purchase one. Your objectified subjective interest lies in the near neighborhood of what would be your
subjective interest if you weren’t hampered by ignorance of the relevant
facts. Suppose you are in fact epistemically limited in way W: a state of
affairs S is part of your objectified subjective interest just if, if you were
epistemically unlimited, then you would desire that if you were epistemically limited in way W, you would want S.
How is this connected with morality? “We thus may say that moral
norms reflect a certain kind of rationality, rationality not from the point of
view of any particular individual, but from what might be called a social
point of view” (p. 190). “I have spoken of what is morally best as a matter
of what is instrumentally rational from a social point of view” (p. 200).
32
The Philosophical Review XCV, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 163ff. Page references to Railton’s
work are to this article.
33
See Railton’s “Naturalism and Prescriptivity,” Social Philosophy and Public Policy 7.1, pp.
158ff.
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What is morally right, therefore, is what is rational—instrumentally rational—from a social point of view.
How are we to understand “instrumentally rational from a social point
of view”? Railton is a little short on details here. Social rationality, it seems,
is close to “what would be rationally approved of were the interests of
all potentially affected individuals counted equally under circumstances
of full and vivid information” (p. 190). This point of view, therefore, involves judgments that are impartial in that they don’t favor the interests
of some persons as opposed to those of others; these judgments are also
comprehensive, in the sense that they concern the interests of all people potentially affected by the action contemplated. (The interests of the rich, or
intelligent, or well-connected don’t count for any more than those of the
poor, dimwitted, or ill-connected.) We can therefore speak of something
like a social interest, or an interest of society. And this social interest will
be some function of the individual (objective) interests of the members
of that society—a function that impartially takes into account everyone’s
interests. We can put the account schematically as follows:
(R)

Act A is morally right for S if and only if S’s doing A appropriately
advances the social interest—i.e., the interest of S’s society.

There are traditional problems for views like this, but I won’t go into
them here; our present interest is in the question whether a procedure
like Railton’s can show that moral realism is consistent with naturalism,
that naturalism can accommodate moral realism. According to Railton’s
(R), the property of being morally right, the property an action has if it is
morally right, is equivalent to the property of appropriately advancing the
social interest: call this property ‘P’. P, we may suppose, is, at least as far
as initial appearances go, naturalistically acceptable (we need not make
heavy weather over ‘appropriately’). As we have seen, given the strong
supervenience of moral properties on naturalistic properties, for any moral property, there is a naturalistic property equivalent to it; perhaps Railton thinks of P as the (or a) naturalistic property equivalent to rightness.
Now the first question is whether Railton takes P to be equivalent to
rightness but distinct from it, or whether he takes it to be identical with
rightness. According to Jackson, “Cornell realists” take it that “ethical
properties are identical with descriptive properties” (Jackson, p. 144); if
he’s right, perhaps Railton holds that P is identical with rightness. The
next question is whether Railton embraces abundantism or sparsism.
From an abundantist perspective, this property P is certainly not the
same property as being right: it is certainly possible to believe that an action
is right without believing that it has P. For example, I believe that helping
one’s aged parents is right, but I have no idea whether or not helping one’s
aged parents has P. It could sensibly be held that rightness and P are necessarily coextensive, that necessarily, an act is right if and only if it has P;
I believe this isn’t so; but one could sensibly hold it. Given abundantism,
however, one can’t sensibly hold that rightness just is P.
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Suppose, then, that sparsism is true. That means, of course, that rightness is indeed identical with P. As we’ve seen, however, this, even if true,
doesn’t at all show that rightness is naturalistically acceptable. Rightness
supervenes on naturalistic properties; therefore there is a naturalistic
property that is equivalent to rightness; given sparsism, that property just
is rightness; and perhaps we can understand Railton as holding that this
property is P. But it is compatible with all this (given sparsism) that rightness is also identical with the property of being such that it is an essential
property of God to command all persons to perform it; for it is compatible
with this that being such that it is an essential property of God to command all
persons to perform it is also equivalent to P, and hence (on sparsism) identical with P. If so, rightness would be identical with a naturalistic property,
all right, but it would also be identical with a property obviously entailing
that there is such a person as God—i.e., a property such that its being instantiated obviously entails that there is such a person as God—in which
case it can hardly be naturalistically acceptable.
Railton’s procedure, therefore, fails to show that rightness is naturalistically acceptable. Suppose sparsism is true: then perhaps he succeeds
in showing that rightness is identical with P. But that is compatible with
rightness also being identical with the property being enjoined by God, in
which case rightness isn’t naturalistically acceptable. Suppose, on the other hand, that abundantism is true. Then being right is clearly not identical
with P. Is it equivalent to P? Even if Railton succeeds in showing that being right is equivalent to P, he fails to show that rightness is natural, for it
might be that rightness is equivalent to P, but also equivalent to a property
that obviously entails that there is such a person as God.
Given abundantism, therefore, one can’t show that rightness or moral
obligation is naturalistic by showing that it is equivalent to a naturalistic property. Indeed, perhaps the only way to show that obligation
is naturalistic is to find a naturalistic property that is identical with it.
But I can’t conceal my opinion that (given abundantism) no naturalistic property is identical with obligation. For surely, for any naturalistic
property P*, it is possible to believe, of an action A, that it has P* while
failing to believe, of A, that it is obligatory, and conversely. According
to G. E. Moore’s open question argument one can always sensibly ask,
with respect to any proposed analysans A of goodness, “But is A really
good?” It’s far from clear that this shows goodness to be unanalyzable;
a correct analysis doesn’t have to be obviously correct. A correct analysis
has to supply necessary and sufficient conditions that are also informative; perhaps there are other conditions that must be met as well; being
obviously correct, however, is not among them. On the other hand, if the
question isn’t whether A is a correct analysis of B, but whether A is the
very same property as B, then the fact that one can believe, of x, that it has
A without believing, of x, that it has B (as would presumably be the case
if one could sensibly ask whether B is really A) shows that A and B are
not identical.
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So if abundantism is true, one can’t show that obligation is naturalistic
by exhibiting a naturalistic property with which one argues that it is identical. Neither, if abundantism is true, can one argue that obligation is naturalistically acceptable by finding a naturalistic property that is equivalent
to it. But what other possibility is there? It looks as if, if abundantism is
true, there is no way to argue cogently that obligation is naturalistically acceptable. On the other hand, if sparsism is true, then not even showing that
obligation is identical with some naturalistic property will suffice to show
that obligation is naturalistically acceptable; for obligation might well be
identical with a naturalistic property, but also identical with a property
obviously entailing that there is such a person as God. It therefore looks
as if there is no way at all of cogently arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. A naturalist could perhaps propose some naturalistic property as a sort of surrogate for obligation;34 but of course that is
not to show that naturalism can accommodate obligation itself.
VI.B.
Second, Ralph Wedgewood’s extremely interesting The Nature of Normativity.35 Wedgewood argues that naturalism can accommodate normativity
taken more generally—not just morality or obligation. Of course obligation and morality are central to normativity; showing that naturalism can
accommodate normativity, in his general sense, is sufficient for showing
that it can accommodate moral obligation. His way of arguing for this conclusion is not precisely that of arguing that there is a naturalistic property
equivalent to moral obligation, but it is closely related to that procedure.36
Wedgewood begins by pointing out that normative properties and relations are not natural properties, and moral facts are not natural facts.
(Here I think he uses the term ‘natural’ the way I’ve been using ‘naturalistic’: i.e., natural facts and properties are naturalistically acceptable facts
and properties.) Furthermore, he says, normative facts and properties are
“irreducible” to natural facts and properties. Nevertheless, normative
properties are “consonant with” naturalism, which, I take it, is to say that
naturalism can accommodate normative properties:
Since normative properties are irreducible, reductive forms of naturalism
must be rejected. Nonetheless, I argue that this metaphysical conception of
the normative is entirely consonant with a broader version of naturalism—
specifically with the idea that normative facts both supervene on, and are
realized in, purely natural facts. (p. 135)

What is this realization—what is it for normative facts to be realized in
purely natural facts? Consider obligation: what would it be for facts involving obligation—for example, that one is obliged to refrain from stealing—
Which is perhaps what Railton does.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
36
If his argument is successful, it follows that there is a naturalistic property equivalent, in
the broadly logical sense, to moral obligation.
34
35
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to be realized in purely natural facts? As far as I can tell, Wedgewood
doesn’t really say what it is for facts of one kind or another to be realized in
purely natural facts; he does say, however, what it is for properties to be realized in purely natural properties. His account (pp. 151–152) goes like this:
(Realization) A normative property P is realized in natural properties
iff (1) P strongly supervenes on natural properties, and (2) it is
an essential feature of P thus to supervene, and (3) there is a
non-disjunctive natural property N that counts as the weakest of
all the non-disjunctive properties that entail A (so that N is x’s
minimal supervenience base for having A).
It is reasonable, I think, to hold that the property of obligation meets
this condition. The first of the three conditions is just our old friend supervenience, and I’ve already argued that obligation is at least sensibly
thought of as strongly supervening on natural(istic) properties. Is it an
essential feature of obligation thus to supervene, i.e., is the second condition satisfied? Wedgewood’s position here perhaps requires a bit of commentary. Obligation strongly supervenes on natural properties, and does
so in every possible world. Now it’s not uncommon to think of an essential
property or feature of an object x as any property x has in every possible
world in which it exists; thus self-identity, being such that 7 + 5 = 12, being either a horse or a nonhorse, and existence are all essential properties of everything. Wedgewood demurs; an essential property or feature of something,
he says, isn’t just any old property it has in every world in which it exists;
an essential property of a thing has to somehow reveal something significant about the nature of that object.37 This condition isn’t entirely clear;
still, Wedgewood takes it to exclude properties of the sort just mentioned.
But then not just any case of strong supervenience, even though it holds
in every possible world, constitutes an essential property of the supervening facts or properties. The facts of mathematics supervene on the facts
of drunkenness and do so in every possible world (an example he borrows from Timothy Williamson): still, this property isn’t closely connected
with whatever it is that makes the facts of mathematics what they are, and
hence is not an essential property of those facts. This distinction between
properties a thing has in every world in which it exists, and properties that
are truly essential to it is a little obscure; nevertheless it seems sensible to
say, with Wedgewood, that it is part of the very nature or essence of obligation that it supervenes on natural properties.
What about the third condition: is there a non-disjunctive property
that counts as the weakest of all the non-disjunctive properties that entail obligation? Again, the notion of a non-disjunctive property is a bit
dicey (it’s clear what a disjunctive predicate is, but much less clear what a
disjunctive property is), but, supposing we understand it, we can see that
37
“we may think of the essence of an object (whether an individual or a universal) as given
by the real definition of that object—that is, by the basic metaphysical principle that states the
nature of that object,” p. 141.
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there are properties reasonably thought to be non-disjunctive, to entail
obligation, and to be such that there aren’t any logically weaker properties that entail obligation. For example, an act’s having the property being
an act of helping one’s aged and needy parents entails that this act is (prima
facie) obligatory, and it isn’t clear that there is any weaker non-disjunctive
property that entails that A is obligatory. It would then follow, according
to Wedgewood, that the property being an act of helping one’s aged and infirm parents is a minimal supervenience base for obligation. It is important
to see, of course, that there may well be many different minimal supervenience bases for obligation; the property being an act of refraining from
stealing would be another.
It is certainly plausible, therefore, to hold that obligation is realized in
natural properties in Wedgewood’s sense of ‘realized in.’ But to show that
it is, is certainly not to show that naturalism can accommodate obligation.
For, once more, perhaps what makes an act obligatory is a divine command: perhaps what makes an act obligatory is God’s commanding all
moral agents to perform it. This could certainly be the case even if it is also
true that obligation is realized, in the above sense, in natural properties. It
could therefore be both that obligation is realized in natural properties, and
that any act is obligatory only because it is commanded by God. But then
it could be both that obligation is realized in natural properties and that
any exemplification of obligation, any case of an action’s being obligatory,
entails the existence of God. Therefore showing that obligation is realized
in natural properties is very far from showing that naturalism can accommodate obligation; it could be both that obligation is thus realized and that
any exemplification of obligation entails the falsehood of naturalism.38
VII. A Problem for Theistic Ethics?
The supervenience of the moral on the natural, therefore, raises a problem for naturalists intent on arguing that naturalism can accommodate
moral realism—realism about obligation, for example. But doesn’t it also
raise problems for theistic views of obligation and other moral properties?
Theists often think ethical properties are intimately related to what God
approves or values or commands. Thus they will often think of moral obligation as in one way or another a matter of what God commands.39 What
is obligatory are those actions God commands or wills; what is wrong are
those actions God prohibits; what is permissible are those actions God
does not prohibit.40 They will also tend to think of what is good as what
God values or approves. So far, fair enough: where is the problem?
38
Wedgewood apparently takes naturalism to be the view that all contingent facts are
“realized in” natural or physical facts (p. 201). I’ve been taking naturalism as the view that
there is no such person as God or anything like God. A little reflection reveals, I think, that
Wedgewood’s version of naturalism entails naturalism in my sense.
39
See footnotes 14, 22 and 23.
40
Of course these bald statements will typically be qualified, as in the view I presented
above.
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One traditional criticism of theistic ethics is the dreaded Euthyphro
problem. The problem is supposed to be that if God commands what he
does because it is right, then there is some moral standard outside of God,
which seems incompatible with his sovereignty and aseity. On the other
hand, if what is right is right because God commands it, then morality
seems arbitrary: if God had commanded murder, theft and rapine, then
those actions would have been obligatory; if he had commanded hate instead of love, then hateful action would have been right and loving action
wrong. As it stands, this alleged criticism is easily handled, at a first level,
anyway. The reply is that God’s very nature constrains what he commands: it is an essential property of God not to command hate instead
of love. There aren’t any possible worlds in which God commands hate
rather than love. True, at least on the usual semantics for counterfactuals,
if God had commanded hate, hate would have been right and love wrong.
But this is of no more interest than the fact that if there were no prime
numbers, all numbers would be prime. The Euthyphro problem, to a first
approximation anyway, is a pseudo-problem.41
Others find a problem for moral realism in the supervenience of the
moral on the descriptive; if that’s a problem, it will also be a problem for
theistic ethics, since theistic ethics is a variety of moral realism.42 It is not
uncommon to say that if properties of kind B supervene on properties of
kind A, then properties of kind A are more fundamental, or important,
or explanatorily basic, or basic in some other way than properties of kind
B. Thus Simon Blackburn: “Belief in supervenience is then at least the
belief that whenever a thing is in some F state, this is because it is in
some underlying G state, or is by virtue of its being in some underlying G state.”43 I’ve even heard it said by respectable physicalist philosophers that the supervenience of mental properties on physical properties shows that mental properties really aren’t anything ‘over and above’
physical properties.
Surely this is much too strong. As we have seen, moral properties supervene on descriptive properties and perhaps also on naturalistic properties. But perhaps it is essential to God to issue certain commands to all
rational creatures; if so, then being a command such that it is essential to God
to issue it to all rational creatures supervenes on descriptive and perhaps
naturalistic properties. Theists, naturally enough, won’t be at all inclined
to think of being a command such that it is essential to God to issue it to all
rational creatures as less important, fundamental, explanatory, or basic
than the descriptive or naturalistic properties on which it supervenes.44
“To a first approximation”: perhaps it re-arises at a deeper level: see below, pp. 000.
Here see Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, chaps. 6 and especially 7; and Timmons and Horgan, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth,” pp. 221ff.
43
Essays in Quasi-Realism, p. 131.
44
Obviously this isn’t restricted to divine commands. The general issues a command: “Advance!” The property of conforming to this command supervenes on properties involving
41
42
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They certainly won’t think that it is nothing over and above those naturalistic properties.
Clearly, the fact that B properties supervene on A properties doesn’t
so much as slyly suggest that A properties are more basic, fundamental,
explanatory, etc. than B properties.45 Truth supervenes on being (weakly,
strongly, globally), but being also supervenes on truth; it doesn’t follow
that each is more basic than the other. Suppose B properties strongly supervene on A properties; then for any B property B there will be an A
property A (broadly) logically equivalent to it. Since A and B are equivalent, they will strongly supervene on each other; but of course it is not
the case that each is more basic than the other. Nonreductive physicalists
usually hold that mental properties supervene on physical properties, and
some seem to think that is sufficient for supposing physical properties
more fundamental or basic than mental. But again, that doesn’t follow for
a moment: if mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties,
for any mental property M there will be a physical property P equivalent
to it; hence M and P supervene on each other; hence P supervenes on M;
it doesn’t follow that M is more basic, etc. than P.46 In fact this or something in the neighborhood is what has led some physicalist philosophers
to declare that you don’t get to be a proper physicalist just by holding that
mental properties supervene on physical properties; thus Terence Horgan
claims that physicalists should endorse ‘superdupervenience,’ rather than
mere supervenience (see footnote 45) and Jaegwon Kim47 claims that supervenience is a statement of the problem, not the solution to it.
Superdupervenience, however, does point to a possible problem in the
neighborhood for theistic ethics, a problem that is not a mere pseudoproblem. The theist is likely to hold that moral obligation is to be understood in terms of some property P (perhaps the property of being such
that it is an essential property of God to command all persons to perform
it) involving God’s will: having this property P is what makes an action
the movement of the troops; it is not the case that the latter properties are more basic than or
explanatory or determinative of the former.
45
One could simply define supervenience as involving the subvening properties being more
basic, fundamental, robustly explanatory, etc., than the supervening properties (or even the
supervening properties not being anything ‘over and above’ the subvening properties); then
‘supervenience’ would express approximately the same property as Terence Horgan’s “superdupervenience” (“From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of
a Material World,” Mind [1993]). But then, of course, it is no longer at all obvious that moral
properties super(duper)vene on descriptive or naturalistic properties.
46
From the theistic point of view, it is a necessary truth that physical properties (globally)
supervene on mental properties; worlds in which God believes the same propositions are
worlds in which physical properties (as well as properties of any other sort) are distributed
in the same way. The converse doesn’t follow: mental properties don’t strongly supervene
on physical properties. For clearly there could be a pair of worlds w and w* physically alike
but in which God held different beliefs; perhaps in w but not w* he believes that a certain
angel thinks a certain thought. I have put this in terms of global supervenience, but given a
sufficiently latitudinarian conception of properties, there will be an equivalent formulation
in terms of individual supervenience.
47
Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
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obligatory. If so, obligation and P supervene on each other. The theist also
wants to hold that what is obligatory, is obligatory because it has P; she
does not hold that an action has P because that action is obligatory. But
how can that be, if each supervenes on the other? What is needed here is
an asymmetrical dependence relation between properties that are logically equivalent.48 God’s will is more basic, more fundamental, and explanatorily prior to obligation; obligation depends upon God’s will in a way in
which God’s will does not depend upon obligation. So is there a relation
of this kind—a relation of asymmetrical dependence between properties
that are logically equivalent? We might think of this as the revenge (or
reappearance) of the Euthyphro problem; the theist holds that an act is
obligatory because God enjoins it, but it is not the case that God enjoins an
act because it is obligatory.
A relation like this is required in other places as well. For example, the
theist may think of propositions as divine thoughts and properties as divine
concepts. The proposition China is smaller than the Netherlands exists necessarily because it is an essential property of God to think this thought, so
that he thinks it in every possible world (although he affirms it in only
some worlds.) But it is not the case that God thinks this thought in every
possible world because it is a necessary truth that this proposition exists.
The proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is necessarily true: that is because it is an essential property of God to think that thought affirmatively (“with assent,” as
Augustine says); but it is not the case that it is part of God’s nature to think
that thought affirmatively because it is necessary that 7 + 5 = 12. The theist
may think of sets as divine collections, divine thinkings-together (Georg
Cantor),49 which would explain why no set is a member of itself and why
there is no universal set. Then she will take it that items a1, a2, . . . an, . . .
form a set because God thinks them together; but it is not the case that
God thinks them together because they form a set.
Accordingly, the theist needs an asymmetrical dependence relation
between equivalent properties and propositions, and even between necessary propositions and necessarily exemplified properties, both in ethics and more generally as well; but is there any such relation? Are there
any clear and uncontroversial examples of such a relation? (Or at any rate
relatively uncontroversial, since that is the best one can hope for in philosophy?) Yes indeed: the much vaunted relation between truth and being
furnishes relations of just this kind. The propositions all men are mortal and
it is true that all men are mortal are equivalent, but the second is true because
the first is, and not conversely. The propositions 7 + 5 = 12 and it is true that
7 + 5 = 12 are equivalent; the second is true because the first is, but not conversely. We can find similar relations among properties. The number 7 has
48
Of course a relation of this sort is also what the nonreductive physicalist needs, if she
hopes to see mental properties as less basic or fundamental than the physical properties on
which they supervene.
49
See M. J. Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and Limitation of Size (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984).

272

Faith and Philosophy

essentially the property of being such that it is true that it is prime. It has
that property because it has essentially the property of being prime; but it
is not the case that it has essentially the property of being prime because
it has essentially the property of being such that it is true that it is prime.
Perhaps still another case of this asymmetrical dependence or explanatory
relation is in analyses: S knows that p because . . . p . . . (fill in your favorite analysis of knowledge, if you are rash enough to have one); it is not
the case that . . . p . . . because S knows that p. Theistic ethics requires an
asymmetrical dependence or explanatory relation between propositions
and properties that are equivalent in the broadly logical sense. This is not
as puzzling as it may initially seem; a similar relation is to be found in
many other areas.
By way of conclusion: the supervenience of moral properties on naturalistic properties presents a real (I would say insoluble) problem for one
who wants to make a case for the idea that metaphysical naturalism can
accommodate morality. Given this supervenience, for any moral property
there will be a naturalistic property equivalent to it; hence, even if what
makes an action right is a property obviously entailing that there is such
a person as God, there may still be a naturalistic property equivalent to
it. But then one can’t show that rightness is naturalistically acceptable by
finding a naturalistic property to which it is equivalent. If, on the other
hand, sparsism is true, then one can’t even show that rightness is naturalistic by finding an apparently naturalistic property to which it is identical.
That is because, given sparsism, rightness might also be identical with the
property being in accord with God’s will. Finally, the supervenience of the
moral on the naturalistic might be thought also to create a problem for
theistic ethics; this appearance, however, is mere appearance.50
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